We present and compare de nitions of the notion of \statistically hiding" protocols, and we propose a novel statistically hiding commitment scheme. Informally, a protocol statistically hides a secret if a computationally unlimited adversary who conducts the protocol with the owner of the secret learns almost nothing about it. One de nition is based on the L 1 -norm distance between probability distributions, the other on information theory. We prove that the two de nitions are essentially equivalent. For completeness, we also show that statistical counterparts of de nitions of computational secrecy are essentially equivalent to our main de nitions.
Introduction
Suppose party A conducts a protocol with party B while using some secret or partly secret input x. How does one state precisely that even if B is unlimited and behaves arbitrarily, B learns almost nothing about x that he did not know before?
This question is of interest in cryptologic protocols. In particular, we consider commitment schemes. They consist of two protocols. In the rst protocol, A commits to a value x, while keeping x secret from B. In the second protocol, which can take place much later, A releases x to B. Commitment schemes play an important role in designing other cryptologic protocols. For instance, a folklore protocol for common coin ipping is constructed as follows: First, A ips a secret coin c 1 and commits to it. Next, B ips a coin c 2 and publishes it. Finally, A reveals c 1 , and c 1 c 2 is taken as the common coin that both A and B trust to be random. Commitment protocols are also important in constructing general perfect or statistical zero-knowledge protocols, see 23] or 6].
Generally, three types of secrecy are distinguished: Perfect secrecy means that an adversary gains absolutely no information about the secret. Statistical secrecy is also unconditional, i.e., unrestricted adversaries are considered, but the adversary is allowed to learn a little about the secret.
Computational secrecy means that the adversary is assumed to be restricted to e cient computations, and currently, computational secrecy always relies on unproven assumptions about the hardness of certain problems. To make statistical secrecy precise, it is natural to describe B's a priori knowledge about x by a probability distribution p from which he knows that x is chosen. After the protocol, given B's view of the protocol, x has a possibly di erent distribution q. We can say that B learns almost nothing new if p and q are somehow close to each other. A complicating, but often overlooked factor is that this should be true for any a priori distribution p.
In the following, we consider two formal notions of the closeness of ensembles of probability distributions. One of these, which we call the bias-based secrecy property, is based on the L 1 -norm di erence between p and q. When x consists of just one bit, this describes the additional advantage B obtains in guessing the value of x. Thus it is the natural extension of the existing de nition of statistically hiding commitment schemes for one bit. Moreover, it coincides with the de nition of statistical zero-knowledge in 17]. The other de nition is based on the di erence in Shannon entropy between p and q. Thus it describes how much information about x the adversary can learn from the protocol. We call it capacity-based secrecy property, because it corresponds to considering the protocol as a channel with x as input and B's view as output. The fact that we can prove this de nition to be essentially equivalent to the rst one allows for much more elegant proofs of secrecy, for instance, if one considers commitments to many bits or many commitments to the same value.
This last point is illustrated by the proof of secrecy for the commitment scheme we present in this paper. This scheme allows commitment to many bits. Its commitment and reveal protocols have a very small constant number of rounds, and the size of a commitment is independent of the number of bits committed to. This also holds for the total communication complexity, except of course for the bits needed to send the secret when it is revealed.
Most schemes in the literature are just bit commitment schemes, and thus, if one commits to many bits, each bit is expanded to, e.g., 500 bits. Note that e cient multi-bit commitment schemes can also be used to reduce the communication complexity of zero-knowledge protocols 20]. A concrete example of this for Boolean circuit satis ability is given later in the paper (see Section 5.3).
Unconditionally hiding bit commitment schemes were presented, e.g., in 6, 4, 8] . In these schemes, the fact that A cannot later change the bit committed to relies on speci c number-theoretic assumptions. More general assumptions are used in 24], which can be based on any collision-intractable hash function, and 23], based on any one-way permutation. Unconditionally hiding multi-bit commitment schemes were presented in 3, 26, 9, 2]. They all rely on speci c number-theoretic assumptions, the hardness of computing discrete logarithms or factoring integers. In contrast, our scheme is based on any collision-intractable hash function. This is an improvement in theory, because the assumption is weaker, and useful in practice, because one can use e cient conventional hash functions such as SHA-1 27] or RIPEMD-160 14] (follow the references in 14] for more such functions and known attacks). The construction is an improvement of the scheme from 24]. Our construction was presented in preliminary form at Crypto '93. A couple of years later Halevi and Micali, who were apparently unaware of the Crypto '93 result, rediscovered the construction and presented it at Crypto '96. Naor 22] has also presented a multi-bit commitment scheme with small amortised communication complexity, based on general assumptions. However, that scheme is of a type dual to ours, i.e., it is only computationally hiding, whereas the binding is unconditional. On stronger assumptions, schemes of this type must have been known in the folklore before, e.g., based on e cient probabilistic public-key encryption.
Organization of the Rest of this Paper
In Section 2, we introduce notation about protocols. In Section 3, we introduce our two main de nitions of statistical secrecy. Section 4 shows that these de nitions are equivalent except for small transformations of the security parameters. In Section 5, we give a precise de nition of multi-bit commitments, present our construction, and prove its security. We show how this and the results of 20, 5] directly give a statistical zero-knowledge argument for Boolean circuit satis ability with small communication complexity. In Section 6, we present further evidence that our de nitions of statistical secrecy are universal: First we show that strengthening the adversaries by auxiliary inputs makes no di erence, and sequential composition of statistically secret protocols is therefore possible. Secondly, we consider statistical counterparts of well-known computational secrecy de nitions and show that they are also essentially equivalent to our two main de nitions.
Protocol Notation
The model of protocols used in this paper is based on probabilistic interactive Turing machines as de ned in 17]. These are Turing machines equipped with a read-only input tape, a work tape, a random tape, and two communication tapes. One communication tape is write-only and used for sending messages, and the other is read-only and used for receiving messages.
A 2-party protocol is a pair of interactive Turing machines sharing their communication tapes. The view of a participant, A, in an execution of an interactive protocol with B is de ned to consist of A's input, all random bits used by A, and all the messages sent and received in this execution of the protocol. We refer to 17] for detailed de nitions.
All our protocols have a security parameter k. This means that k in unary representation is a common parameter on the input tapes of both participants. Usually, there are secret inputs, too, i.e., parameters that are on only one of the input tapes. The honest participants in our protocols are polynomial-time, i.e., the corresponding interactive Turing machines stop after polynomial time in k.
X will denote any machine playing the role of a machine X in a given protocol, but not necessarily following the prescribed methods. Such machines are used to model cheaters. Note that this does not tacitly restrict \unre-stricted" adversariesB to computable functions, because we will quantify over k andB separately.
De nitions of Secrecy
We now present de nitions of the statistical secrecy of one party's input in a 2-party protocol.
Consider a 2-party protocol, (A, B), with security parameter k. The input of A, apart from the common parameter k, is denoted by x. The question is how much a possibly cheatingB learns about x. We assume that x is chosen from a nite set M(k), whose size N(k) = jM(k)j may depend 5 on k. We simply write M and N if no confusion about k is possible. We also assume that N(k) is non-decreasing and that B does not have an input, except for k. This assumption does not reduce the generality of the results of this section, see Section 6.1.
We mostly work in the following probability spaces: Let anyB, any k, and any a priori distribution p of A's input be given, where p x denotes the a priori probability of a particular value x. The protocol now induces a joint probability space on the views of both parties, determined by the choice of x and the random choices, i.e., the contents of the random tapes, of both parties. Probabilities in this space are simply denoted by Pr ]. Let X denote the random variable corresponding to x and V the random variable corresponding to the view ofB. Whenever one of the parametersB, k, and p is not clear from the context, X or V will be given corresponding indices, e.g., X p . Individual views ofB are usually denoted by v. Random De nition 3.2 The protocol is said to have the capacity-based secrecy property if, for every adversary,B, and every security parameter, k, its channel capacity CB is at most 2 ?k .
u t This is a natural information-theoretic de nition of secrecy, because it means that for any a priori information,B's view from the commit protocol only gives negligible additional information about X.
Relations Between the De nitions
We will show next that the bias-based secrecy property and the capacitybased secrecy property are equivalent except for small transformations of the security parameters.
Theorem 4.1 Consider a two-party protocol, (A; B), as above and let n(k) = log 2 N(k). a) If (A; B) has the bias-based secrecy property, it has a channel capacity of at most 2 ?k (n(k) + k) for anyB. Thus, a capacity of at most 2 ?k can be achieved by using a security parameter k 0 where k 0 k + log 2 (n(k 0 ) + k 0 ). b) If (A; B) has the capacity-based secrecy property, it has an average bias of at most p 2 ln 2 2 ?k=2 for anyB. Thus, a bias of at most 2 ?k can be achieved by using a security parameter k 0 2k + 1.
The two parts of this theorem are proved in the following two subsections. We also show that the bounds given in both parts are essentially optimal, see the examples at the end of both subsections. In particular, Example 4.1shows that there is no bound on the capacity given just the bias, independent of n(k). This may be the reason why no related inequalities seem to exist in the literature, in contrast to Part b). Nevertheless, the condition on k 0 in Part a) of the theorem is always solvable, unless n(k 0 ), the number of bits of the secret, is growing exponentially in k 0 , which would be unreasonable in practice.
From Bias to Capacity
We start with some preliminaries about the entropy function. where p x is short for p(x). u t Note that we have now de ned entropy directly on probability distributions, not only via random variables that induce these distributions. In the following we shall freely use H to denote the entropy in both cases. Thus H(p) = H(X p ) in the scenario of Section 3. Proof We scale to L 1 -norm 1, i.e., to a probability distribution, and exploit that the entropy of probability distributions on a given set is maximal for the uniform distribution. Let u t
The following example shows that it is not in general possible to remove the dependency on n(k) from the bound we have proved.
Example 4.1
Consider the protocol in which the secret input is simply revealed. Then, it is easy to see that both the average bias and the information are maximal when the input is uniformly distributed. In this case, the average bias is optimal except for a factor of 2 and the addition of k. Furthermore, this protocol also shows that the inequality I(X p ; V p ) Bias p (n(k) + k); which is obtained in the above proof, is optimal within a factor of 2. u t
From Capacity to Bias
We will prove the second half of Theorem 4.1 using Pinsker's inequality. Let ; be probability distributions on a nite set with probabilities i ; i . Then the information divergence from to is de ned as The following example shows that it is really necessary to double the security parameter when going from capacity to bias.
Example 4.2
We consider a protocol that implements a binary symmetric channel with an error probability of Either party may reject in the commit protocol, but if both parties are honest, this should almost never happen. More formally, A c and B c may output a special value reject, but if in fact (A c ; B c ) is executed, and notÃ c orB c , the probability that an output is reject decreases faster than k ?c for all c > 0. The reveal protocol is denoted (A r ; B r ). The input of A r should be the view of A c in the commit protocol, while B r gets the commitment as input. At the end of the reveal protocol, B r outputs reject or a pair (accept, x). The intuitive meaning is that either B has detected cheating by A, or he accepts that A has opened the commitment to reveal the value x. In some concrete schemes, it makes sense to de ne the commitment and the input to A r as a subset or a function of the messages sent and the view, respectively. However, our de nition is simpler and without loss of generality.
We will only consider commitment schemes with non-interactive opening, i.e., where the reveal protocol consists of A r sending one message to B r . Without loss of generality, we can then assume that the message is of the form (x; m), where x should be the value committed to, and that B r , on receiving such a message from A r orÃ r , never outputs (accept, x') with x 0 6 = x.
We have already built into the model another useful property that our construction ful ls and that we call public veri cation: B can verify the opening based on the commitment only. This means that anyone who trusts that a given commitment is the result of a conversation with B can verify the opening without knowing B's random bits.
Note that the equivalence results in the preceding section also hold for commitment schemes without these two properties.
De nition 5.1 A pair of protocols as described above is called a multi-bit commitment scheme with non-interactive opening if it has the following two properties:
Binding property: LetÃ c be any polynomial-time bounded machine that executes the commit protocol with B and then outputs two messages (x; m) and (x 0 ; m 0 ). Intuitively, with these messages, the cheating committer hopes to have the choice between opening the commitment to reveal x or x 0 , respectively. Let p(Ã c ; k) be the success probability of A c , i.e., the probability that both messages (x; m) and (x 0 ; m 0 ) would be accepted by B r . The probability is taken over the coin-ips ofÃ c u t By Theorem 4.1, the two possibilities in the secrecy de nition are equivalent except for small transformations of the security parameter. Recall that these de nitions assume thatB can have arbitrary a priori information about the string committed to.
E cient Statistically Hiding Commitments
Naor and Yung have shown that a statistically hiding bit commitment scheme can be built from collision-intractable hash functions 24]. This scheme needs interaction only in an initialisation phase, after which both committing and opening are non-interactive. We now modify this scheme to get e cient multi-bit commitments. Finally, collision-intractability means that for all c > 0 and all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A H , the probability that A H nds x; y 2 f0; 1g m such that x 6 = y and h(x) = h(y) is less than m ?c for m su ciently large. The probability is over the random selection of h and the random choices of A H . u t
In the commitment scheme, we need a family H such that the output length of functions in H k for a security parameter k is k + 1 and the input length is arbitrary, as long as polynomial in k. By u t For the analysis of this protocol, we use the following privacy ampli cation result (see Fig. 1 ).
Theorem 5.5 Let y 2 f0; 1g k 00 be chosen uniformly at random, and let e : f0; 1g k 00 ! f0; 1g t be an arbitrary function. Let 0 < s < k 00 ?t; k 0 = k 00 ?t?s and let F be a universal 2 class of hash functions from f0; 1g k 00 to f0; 1g k 0 . If f is chosen uniformly at random in F, the expected entropy of f(y) when f, e and e(y) are given is at least k 0 ? 2 ?s = ln 2 bits. More formally, H(F(Y )jF; e(Y )) k 0 ? 2 ?s ln 2 : Here F denotes the random variable de ned by the choice of f (no confusion with the set F should be possible), and e is xed and thus not listed in the condition. This theorem is almost a restatement of 1, Corollary 5] which in our notation is I(F(Y ); F; e(Y )) 2 ?s = ln 2. One can easily see in the proof of that corollary that our slightly stronger statement is also proved. Figure 1: Privacy ampli cation: y is completely random, but some information is given by e(y). s is a security margin.
Theorem 5.6 Protocol 1 is a statistically hiding commitment scheme, under the assumption that the family H is collision-intractable. It allows committing to n bits by a commitment of size k + 1 bits and total communication complexity for commitment and opening of 10(k + 1) bits, plus the n bits of x.
One or more parties A can execute the protocol commit an arbitrary, more precisely polynomial in k, number of times with B based on one execution of the initialisation phase.
Proof The size of the commitments and total communication complexity is clear from the description above and the fact that the universal 2 hash function can be speci ed by 6k 0 bits. We did not count the initialisation phase here, because we assume that it has been carried out once for many commitments. Anyway, with most proposed collision-intractable families of hash functions, a function h can also be speci ed with d k bits, where d is a small integer constant.
The binding property is an immediate consequence of the collision intractability of H: Assume that an algorithmÃ c contradicts the binding property. Then construct a collision-searching algorithm A H as follows: On input h, it simply callsÃ c , which is also a non-interactive algorithm that works on an input h from the initialisation phase. SupposeÃ c outputs c and (f; x; y) 6 = (f 0 ; x 0 ; y 0 ) which both open the commitment correctly, and where x 6 = x 0 (this is necessary forÃ c 's success). It follows that h(f 0 jjh(y 0 )jjh(x 0 ) f 0 (y 0 )) = c = h(fjjh(y)jjh(x) f(y)), so if (f 0 jjh(y 0 )jjh(x 0 ) f 0 (y 0 )) 6 = (fjjh(y)jjh(x) f(y)), A H outputs these two values. Otherwise it follows that h(y) = h(y 0 ). Thus, A H outputs (y; y 0 ) if y 6 = y 0 . Otherwise, we know y = y 0 and f = f 0 , and thus h(x) = h(x 0 ). Therefore A H now outputs (x; x 0 ), where x 6 = x 0 by the initial assumption. It follows from this description that the success probability of A H is exactly the same as that ofÃ c .
We now show capacity-based secrecy. First observe that it is enough to show this for a modi ed commit protocol in which f; h(y) and h(x) f(y) are sent, since this gives the recipient even more information than before. Then let an a priori distribution of x and an arbitraryB c be given. Applying In (1) we used that X and Z are functions of h(X) Z and X; similarly in (2) . As this bound holds for all a priori distributions, it is also a bound on the capacity.
Note that both parts of this proof are still valid if A makes more than one commitment based on the same public function h. u t One can easily see that among the three applications of h in the commit protocol, only that to y is essential for security. Hashing x may be omitted if x is rather short anyway. The nal hashing of the commitment may be omitted in applications where the e ciency of the reveal protocol seems more important than that of the commit protocol. The given version with very short commitments and longer revealing is particularly suitable if not all commitments are opened.
Using the Commitment Scheme to Build ZeroKnowledge Protocols
This subsection considers an application of our commitment scheme to construct zero-knowledge protocols. We assume here that the reader is familiar with the concepts of proof systems and zero-knowledge. For formal de nitions please refer to 17]. An interactive argument is the same as a proof system, except that the soundness property is only required to hold for all polynomial time cheatingprovers. Our commitment scheme allows us to build a statistical zero-knowledge argument for Boolean circuit satis ability, and so for any NP problem. This can be seen by combining the scheme with two other ingredients:
The protocol by Brassard et al. from 5] for showing that a Boolean circuit is satis able. This protocol works based on any bit commitment scheme for single bits and is a computational zero-knowledge proof system or a perfect/statistical zero-knowledge argument, depending on whether the commitments used are computationally or unconditionally hiding. The basic step in the protocol is that the prover commits to O(n) bits, where n is the size of the circuit, and depending on a random challenge from the veri er, the prover either opens all the bits or a speci c subset of them that depends on the satisfying assignment. This basic step is iterated a number of times. The method by Kilian et al. from 20] for using a multi-bit commitment scheme in any protocol of a type they call \subset-revealing", of which the protocol from 5] is an example. The interesting point is that the method works even though the commitment scheme does not allow opening individual bits in a multi-bit commitment. The method replaces each basic step in the original protocol by a new one which needs 5 messages instead of 3 and contains 2 commitments to O(n) bits each instead of O(n) commitments to 1 bit each. If the prover could cheat in the old basic step with probability 1/2, he can cheat in the new one with probability 3/4. By combining these three ingredients, one obtains an extremely e cient statistical zero-knowledge argument for Boolean circuit satis ability, and hence for any NP problem. More precisely, one can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.7 Assume that a family of collision-intractable hash functions exists. Then there is a statistical zero-knowledge argument for Boolean circuit satis ability with the following properties: if the input circuit is of size n, then the protocol requires communicating O(n 2 ) bits. If any probabilistic polynomial-time prover can cheat with probability (n) 2 ?n , then there is a probabilistic algorithm that can nd collisions for the hash function used in expected time polynomial in n and proportional to 1= (n) 2 .
Note that for a protocol of the type we consider, there are actually a number of parameters, which one may consider independently: the size of the input circuit, n, the logarithm of the probability with which we will allow the prover to cheat (assuming he cannot break the hash function), and the output length of the hash function. To simplify, we have followed a number of earlier works in the theorem above and have let all parameters be O(n).
Using the protocol from 5] based on a 1-bit commitment scheme would give a communication complexity of O(n 3 ) bits. Kilian 18, 19] has found a protocol based on probabilistically checkable proofs that would, with our choice of parameters, have a communication complexity of O(n 2 log n) 1 . Using a completely di erent method, Cramer and Damg ard 10] obtained an argument that also has O(n 2 ) complexity. In comparison, their protocol is perfect zero-knowledge and constant round, but it is based on more specialized assumptions, namely the hardness of computing discrete logarithms in a group of prime order or of factoring integers.
Perhaps even more interesting is the performance in practice. For instance, if we use SHA-1 as the hash function, which has a 160-bit output, and we set the maximal probability for the prover to cheat at 2 ?50 , then a circuit consisting of 10000 gates could be proved satis able using about 3 Mbyte of communication.
To assess the computation e ort required, it seems reasonable to assume that an implementation would spend almost all its time hashing. SHA-1 can be implemented on standard PC's at speeds around 6-8 Mbyte/sec. This suggests that, at a security level of 2 ?50 , a real implementation should be able to handle around 20000 gates per second, assuming that the communication lines can keep up. To the best of our knowledge this is the most practical protocol proposed for circuit satis ability. 6 More Variants of Statistical Secrecy
Auxiliary Input and Composition
In Section 3, we have de ned secrecy of an input x against an adversaryB that has no input, or at least none related to x. Such inputs would be called auxiliary inputs. In computational zero-knowledge, including auxiliary inputs in the de nition proved necessary for the secrecy if a protocol is executed repeatedly 25, 28] . Similarly, such auxiliary inputs occur if a statistically hiding protocol is repeated. However, in this case we can show quite easily that secrecy in the setting with auxiliary input is a consequence of normal secrecy. We now describe this formally.
An auxiliary-input attackerB aux on a two-party protocol (A; B) is de ned just like a normal attackingB, except thatB aux also gets an input y, where x and y may have an arbitrary joint a priori distribution p aux . The intuitive idea is that y may be an output from a previous protocol that A executed with the secret x. We de ne auxiliary-input capacity of such a protocol as follows: Let V aux denote the view ofB aux .
CB aux = max paux I(V paux ; X paux jY paux ); where indicesB aux have been omitted for brevity. Auxiliary-input secrecy is de ned to mean that CB aux 2 ?k for allB aux and all k. Lemma 6.1 If a protocol (A; B) has the capacity-based secrecy property, it also provides auxiliary-input secrecy.
Conclusion
We have studied notions of statistical secrecy of a protocol input. By proving that an information-theoretic de nition is essentially equivalent to a de nition based on the L 1 -norm, which generalizes previous de nitions in cryptology, we opened ways for more elegant proofs of secrecy, because information is a measure that allows many types of combinations. We demonstrated this in the proof of a multi-bit commitment scheme and a proof of the composability of protocols.
The commitment scheme is of independent interest because it is e cient and can be built from arbitrary collision-intractable hash functions, which is both a weak assumption in theory and useful in practice, since very efcient hash functions exist. An interesting open question is whether the reverse implication is also true, i.e., whether the existence of e cient multibit commitment schemes implies the existence of collision-intractable hash functions.
